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INTRODUCTION
The strength of a patent as an instrument of commercial power to
protect an invention rests squarely on the drafting quality of its
claims.' Under United States law, a patent's claims, not its accompa-
nying "specification," define the metes and bounds2 of the subject
matter that a patentee can prevent others from making, using,
importing, selling, or offering for sale.3 To wit, while a patentee need
only disclose in his specification a single, best embodiment of his
invention, he may be entitled to claim broadly his invention to
encompass many more embodiments-and so ensnare a wider net of
accused infringers-even if the patentee never explicitly disclosed how
to make and use those other embodiments.' The patentee's claim
1. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-77 (1997) (defining and explaining significance of requirements
for patent application to U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")). Tie specification will
include, inter alia, a title, background, a brief summary description, a detailed description, a
claim or claims, an abstract of the disclosure, and necessary drawings of the invention or
discovery. See id. § 1.77. Although technically part of the specification, the patent's claim(s)
bear(s) the distinction of being the sole measure of the grant. SeeAro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961).
2. See Zenith Labs., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1285, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[T]he claim ... sets the metes and bounds of the
invention entitled to the protection of the patent system."); In reVamco Machine and Tool, Inc.,
752 F.2d 1564, 1577 n.5, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 617, 625 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[C]laims are not
technical descriptions of the disclosed inventions but are legal documents like the descriptions
of lands by metes and bounds in a deed which define the area conveyed but do not describe the
land.") (emphasis added).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (explaining ways in which patentee can enforce right to
exclude others from infringement); see also Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391,
395-96,155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697,701 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (explaining heightened relevance of patent's
claims over its specification).
4. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71.
The specification must set forth the precise invention for which a patent is solicited,
in such manner as to distinguish it from other inventions and from what is old. It
must describe completely a spedflc embodiment of the process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter or improvement invented, and must explain the mode of
operation or principle whenever applicable. The best mode contemplatedby the inventor
of carrying out his invention must be set forth.
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may even be enforceable against later, improved embodiments that
were unforeseen at the time the patentee filed his patent applica-
tion.' By contrast, a specification that provides detailed instructions
on how to make and use even thousands of varieties of an invention
cannot broaden a narrowly drafted claim that encompasses only a
single one of these varieties.6
But claims are nothing more than strings of words, and the very
nature of language can render words arguably ambiguous-even if
not indefinite-and thus subject to contrary interpretations. The
stakes for a particular interpretation are high for both the patentee
and the accused infringer, because whether a product or process
literally infringes a claim is often a corollary to a particular explication
of a claim's meaning.' Therefore, it is hardly surprising that a team
of lawyers for the patentee will typically try to convince a court that
one interpretation is correct, while another team of lawyers for the
accused infringer will argue for a contrary construction. The
Supreme Court's affirmance of the Federal Circuit's decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.' makes it unequivocal that the
court, not the jury, must decide which side-if either-is right.9
I& (emphasis added). For a case discussing the scope of description required in a patent
specification relative to what may be legitimately claimed, see Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent,
Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737,1745 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that a patent
"is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on another embodiment of the
invention which is inadequately disclosed").
5. See United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1250, 1252, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1463, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that patent applicant need not
predict every possible improvement or commercial embodiment of the invention, and that
infringement will not be prevented by distinctions "directed solely to a later state of arte).
6. SeeRailroad Co. v. Mellon, 104 U.S. 112, 118 (1881). The Court expressed the rule that
"the scope of letters-patent should be limited to the invention covered by the claim, and that
though the claim may be illustrated, it cannot be enlarged by the language used in other parts
of the specification." Id
7. An infringement analysis has two steps: first, the claim must be properly construed and,
second, the claim must be compared to the allegedly infringing device. See General Mills, Inc.
v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 981, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), af'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996)). "Literal infringement requires
that every limitation of the patent claim be found in the accused infringing device." Id., 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (citing Read Corp. v. Protec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1426, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). "The literal infringement determination, whether properly
construed claims read onto an accused product or method, is a question of fact." Id. (citing
Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med fg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1034,22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528
(Fed. Cir. 1992)). A finding of infringement is possible, however, absent a showing that every
limitation of the patent claim is literally present in an accused infringing device, so long as an
equivalent of every limitation can be shown to be present. See infra notes 30-33 and
accompanying text (considering infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
8. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), affg52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
9. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996) (holding that
"the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the
province of the court").
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Were the issue of judge or jury the only effect of the Markman
decision, litigators could still hope to mount battles of expert
witnesses, honed to appeal to the sophistication of the bench rather
than the populist sentiments of a jury, in order to convince the court
of a particular claim interpretation. But Markman went the additional
step of opining that expert opinion testimony "is entitled to no
deference,"" and that "the court has complete discretion to adopt
the expert legal opinion as its own, to find guidance from it, or to
ignore it entirely, or even to exclude it.""1
Moreover, in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,2 decided fifteen
months after Markman, the Federal Circuit reiterated and further
emphasized the centrality of intrinsic evidence-and the general
marginality of extrinsic evidence in the form of expert opinion
testimony-as sources for claim interpretation."' While intimating
that reliance by the district court on expert testimony in order to
better understand the nature of the technology underlying a claimed
invention may well be proper, the court stated that:
other expert testimony, whether it be of an attorney, a technical
expert, or the inventor, on the proper construction of a disputed claim
term ... may only be relied upon if the patent documents, taken
as a whole, are insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed
claim terms. Such instances will rarely, if ever, occur.14
The policy behind this statement boils down to a matter of notice:
"Any other rule would be unfair to competitors who must be able
to rely on the patent documents themselves, without consideration
of expert opinion that then does not even exist, in ascertaining the
scope of a patentee's right to exclude.""
10. Markman, 52 F.3d at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332.
11. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.RL Bard, Inc., 922
F.2d 792, 797, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Within the context of a
patent infringement case, expert testimony is considered to be "extrinsic evidence," which is that
evidence external to the patent and prosecution history. See id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
Extrinsic evidence includes expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.
See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330. "It is useful 'to show what was then old, to distinguish what was
new, and to aid the court in the construction of the patent.'" M, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330
(quoting Brown v. Piper, 91 U.S. 37, 41 (1875)). However, the intrinsic evidence of record
should be considered first in construing patent claims. See Hunt-Weson, 103 F.3d at 981, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
at 1329). Intrinsic evidence includes the patent's claims, specification, and prosecution history.
See Hunt-Wesson, 103 F.3d at 981, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1442.
12. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
13. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,1582-83,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573,
1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
14. Id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
15. Id at 1584,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (quoting Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG
Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1578, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1678-79 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
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The principle of notice as applied to claim construction is not a
purely post-Markman development, however.'" Indeed, as demon-
strated below, the use of intrinsic evidence by the Federal Circuit to
construe claim terms has remained a long-standing, virtually ubiqui-
tous exercise in the claim interpretation case law. But Markman and
its progeny particularly emphasize the neccesity-and often the
sufficiency-of intrinsic evidence in disposing of claim interpretation
issues. In light of Markman and its progeny, patent practitioners are
now on heightened alert to take particular care in specification and
claim drafting, and in the statements made to the Patent Office
during prosecution, 7 in order to reduce ambiguity as to the intended
meaning of claim terms.18 Litigators are now also particularly apt to
reorient their claim interpretation arguments in favor of intrinsic
evidence to the extent possible. The dust has not yet settled, but in
the minds of many, patent practice has been catapulted into new,
uncharted territory.
Even in the post-Markman era, however, the Federal Circuit has
found it necessary to consult extrinsic materials, such as dictionaries,
in order to arrive at the "correct" interpretation of a claim term.
Expert testimony, at least to the extent that it sheds light on relevant
technology, has played a role as well. It would therefore be unduly
limiting to view claim interpretation after Markman as an altogether
brave new world, for while the Court's rhetoric has signaled a
paradigmatic shift in the way one looks at claims, the Court has not
thrown out the baby with the bathwater. In short, the new era has
16. Indeed, notice has long undergirded the application of prosecution history estoppel.
See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (stating that point of prosecution history estoppel is to prevent a patentee from
claiming "subject matter" under his patent which was "relinquished during prosecution" through
the doctrine of equivalents). A competitor should be able to discern what is covered by a patent
from examination of the prosecution history. See id, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939. In fact, the
"standard in determining what was relinquished is an objective one" based on what a competitor
could reasonably conclude from the prosecution history. See id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
[W]e conclude one of skill in the art... would not have been put on notice that the
term meant other than what it says .... It would not be appropriate for us now to
interpret the claim differentiyjust to cure a drafting error .... That would unduly
interfere with the function of claims in putting competitors on notice of the scope of
the claimed invention.
Id., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
17. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
18. In light of the presumption of estoppel articulated in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Hilton Davis, practioners must also take care in giving reasons for amendments to
claims so as to minimize the scope of prosecution history estoppel. See Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1049-51 (1997) (discussing infringement action
asserting that competitor's ultrafiltration method used to purify dye infringed patented method
under doctrine of equivalents); see also infra note 31 and accompanying text (describing patent
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
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not rendered pre-Markman decisions altogether obsolete as a
predictor of how the court will likely treat an intrinsic record in the
future. Indeed, much can still be learned from how the court has
treated intrinsic records in the past.
To this end, the purpose of this Article is to present case digests
that illustrate how the Federal Circuit has gone about its business of
claim interpretation-by primarily relying on intrinsic evidence-both
before and after Markman. Anomalies are pointed out, and limita-
tions on the use of extrinsic evidence are discussed. As will be seen,
the Federal Circuit has not so much radically altered its manner of
claim construction as it has renewed its focus on adequate public
notice as perhaps the fundamental constraint on the claim interpreta-
tion process.
I. BACKGROUND
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the Federal Circuit's
claim interpretation strategies, a few basic points warrant preliminary
discussion.
First, before a patentee can even contemplate enforcing his patent
against an accused infringer (and, in doing so, subjecting the patent's
claims to interpretation by the courts), the patent's claims must first
be examined and allowed by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO"). This process is known as "patent prosecution.'
19
A basic inquiry during the course of examination is whether the
language of the proposed claim is vague or indefinite,"0 or whether it
reads on prior art 
2 1
In making these inquiries, the USPTO engages in a claim interpre-
tation process designed to minimize ambiguities in claim language
22
19. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINNG PROCEDURE § 706 (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter MPEP].
An application should not be allowed, unless and until issues pertinent to patentability
have been raised and resolved in the course of examination, since otherwise the
resultant patent would notjustify the statutory presumption of validity (35 U.S.C. 282),
nor would it "strictly adhere" to the requirements laid down by Congress in the 1952
Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The standard to be applied in all cases is
the "preponderance of the evidence" test. In other words, an examiner should reject
a claim if, in view of the prior art and evidence of record, it is more likely than not
that the claim is unpatentable.
Id
20. This inquiry is statutorily mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, which
provides that claims must "particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
21. For example, if the claim is anticipated by prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or rendered
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
22. See MPEP, supra note 19, § 2171 (explaining that one of the essential purposes of
examination is to determine whether or not claims are precise, clear, correct, and unambigu-
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and to assess the applicability of prior art. An examiner's typically
broad interpretation for purposes of examination is not necessarily
the same as-and may in fact be quite different from-the interpreta-
tion that a court will accord a claim for the purpose of assessing
infringement or claim validity. This Article focuses on the infringe-
ment/validity side of claim interpretation, not on the examination
side.
Second, a claim may be considered ambiguous, and thus not in
compliance with the definiteness requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, if it inferentially recites language that lacks
antecedent basis.23 For example, the claim language, "A chair compris-
ing a back member, seat member, and vertical support members,
wherein the chair legs are made of wood," is indefinite because the
term "legs" has no antecedent basis in the claim. Although "legs" may
be an example of "vertical support members," the term "legs" is of an
arguably very different scope than the phrase "vertical support
members." Both terms cannot be used in the same claim to represent
the same thing. This problem can easily be avoided if each item
recited in a claim is always referred to, both in the specification and
throughout the claims, in exactly the same way. The discussion below
concerns how the Federal Circuit has addressed claim ambiguities.
None of the ambiguities, however, are of the technical sort that can
arise from inferential introduction of a term without a positively
recited antecedent basis for the simple reason that claims containing
terms that lack such antecedent basis should never have survived the
examination process.
Third, questions of claim validity and claim infringement are virtual
mirror images of each other. In typical practice, invalidity and
noninfringement are often raised in tandem as defenses by a party
accused of infringing a patentee's claim.24 The accused infringer
will argue that if a patentee's claim is interpreted broadly enough to
encompass his accused device, then the claim is invalid for being
broader than is justifiable based on the specification or as being so
broad as to cover the prior art. Conversely, if the claim is narrow
ous).
23. See id § 2173.05(e) ("[L]ack of clarity could arise where a claim refers to 'said lever'
or 'the lever,' when the claim contains no earlier recitation or reference to a lever and where
it would be unclear as to what element the limitation was making reference."); see also
Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp., 877 F.2d 1561, 1564-65, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1132, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (discussing patent examiner's finding of lack of antecedent basis in
patent application for reason of indefiniteness in claim terms).
24. See, eg., Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 395, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
697, 701 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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enough to be valid, the argument will be made that the claim can not
encompass the device at issue. In rendering its decision in an action
for patent infringement, a court often must rule on both the question
of validity and the question of infringement.' For both determina-
tions, the claims at issue as a general rule will be interpreted by a
court in the same way.26 The examples that follow emphasize claim
interpretation for the purpose of assessing infringement, but the
analyses of the Federal Circuit's interpretive techniques in that
context apply to assessing claim validity as well.
Fourth, patent claims usually contain three distinct parts: a
preamble, which introduces the claim; a transition word or phrase;
and last, the body of the claim." Terms in the preamble and
transition may confer additional claim limitations. Most of the time,
questions of interpretation are directed to the body of claims, because
a claim's body is its principle source of limitations. Therefore, the
examples below emphasize the interpretation of terms within the body
of a claim, although preamble terms are briefly considered as well.
Insofar as the proper construction of transition terms28 is relatively
well settled in U.S. patent law, extended discussion of such terms is
excluded from the scope of this Article.29
25. Indeed, a holding of noninfringement by an appellate court does not relieve that
court's responsibility to dispose of validity issues. See Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83, 99-101 (1993).
26. SeeBeachcombersv.W'ldeWood Creative Prods., Inc., 31 F.3d 1154,1163, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1653, 1660 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("We have already interpreted the claims for purposes of
assessing their validity. The same interpretation of course applies to the infringement analysis."
(citing Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allen Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 828 n.7, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1508, 1511 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
27. Some claims also contain a concluding phrase that "sums up" the claim by reciting what
the elements of the claim accomplish. In general, when a concluding phrase does nothing more
than state the results of the limitations in the claim, the phrase "adds nothing to the
patentability or substance of the claim," and as such, does not confer a further limitation on the
claim. See Texas Instruments Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1172, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
28. The transition term is usually one of the following three: "consisting of," "consisting
essentially of," and "comprising." "Comprising" is the most common, as it is the broadest.
29. The phrase "consisting of" limits the claim to only those elements recited in the body
of the claim following the transition phrase. Thus, if a claim recites "A product consisting of
elements A and B," a product that contains elements A, B and C will probably not infringe. See
Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prods. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1282-83, 230
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 45,47 (Fed Cir. 1986) (noting that while the phrase "consisting of" when used
in the preamble, will exclude from infringement a device containing additional elements, it will
not exclude from infringement such a device when used in an element of a claim and not in
the preamble). The phrase "consisting essentially of" is a bit broader, usually reserved for claims
directed to compositions of matter, the phrase excludes from the scope of the claim additional
ingredients that materially affect the nature of the composition recited in the claim, but includes
additional elements that do not materially affect the nature of the recited composition. The
partly open, partly closed nature of the "consisting essentially of" language may allow an
applicant to avoid prior art while still allowing for a relatively broad reading of the claim. See
United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1248, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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Finally, once a claim has been interpreted by a court, an accused
product or process can be found to infringe a patent claim in one of
two ways: either literally or under the "doctrine of equivalents."
Literal infringement will be found if an accused product or process
meets each and every limitation of a properly interpreted claim.'
Under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement may also be found
even if each claim limitation is not literally met, so long as the
differences between the accused product or process and the claimed
invention, with respect to each claim limitation, are insubstantial as
determined by the trier of fact."' The doctrine of equivalents can
thus, in effect, expand the reach of a claim beyond the bounds
accorded to it by the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the claim's
language. 2 Most of the discussion below concerns the claim
interpretation process per se, which occurs as the first step in an
infringement analysis.3" The last section focuses on the relationship
between claim interpretation and the doctrine of equivalents.
1461, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (affirming district court's finding that patent was invalid and
infringed); Harold C. Wegner, U.S. Claim Interpretation in Patent Infringement in the United States
of America (Kyoto Seminar) (1992). The phrase "comprising" is the broadest of the transition
phrases, and encompasses any number of additional elements, whether material or immaterial.
See Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1263, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 805, 806
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing patent infringement action brought by assignee of inventor of cube
puzzle).
30. The proposition that a finding of infringement cannot lie unless an accused product
or process meets each and every limitation in the patentee's claim is traditionally known as the
"all elements rule." See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1582 n.8,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1373 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040, 1049 (1997); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931,
935, 949, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1739-40, 1751-52 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also supra note 7 and
accompanying text (discussing aspects of literal infringement).
31. See Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("To establish infringement of a patent, every limitation set forth
in a claim must be found in an accused product or process exactly or by a substantial
equivalent." (citing Coming Glass Works v. Sumimoto Elec. U.SA, Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1259,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962, 1967 (Fed. Cir. 1989))). See Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1046-47. The
doctrine of equivalents was interpreted by the Supreme Court to require that infringement
occur only if the accused device "'performs substantially the same function in substantially the
same way to obtain the same result.'" Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S.
605, 608 (1950) (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
32. The Supreme Court in March 1997 directly addressed the doctrine of equivalents in
Hilton Davis, 117 S. Ct. at 1044. Addressing the concern that the doctrine was being interpreted
too broadly, the Court affirmed the use of the doctrine of equivalents so long as it is applied
"to each of the individual elements of a claim, rather than to the accused product or process
as a whole." See id.
33. See Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1839 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing the two prongs of infringement
analysis as (1) properly construing the claim "to determine its scope and meaning," and (2)
comparing "the claim as properly construed to the accused device or process").
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I. WHERE THE CoURT LOOKS TO INTERPRET CLAIMS
To resolve ambiguities in claim language, a court will look to four
basic places for guidance: the claim language itself, the specification,
the prosecution history,' and extrinsic evidence (such as dictionaries,
treatises, and expert testimony). As discussed above, Markman and its
progeny make a trial or reviewing court's reliance on the last source,
extrinsic evidence, especially expert testimony regarding the interpre-
tation of claim terms, entirely discretionary. 5
The facts and legal analysis in Markman itself serve to illustrate
these principles as a steppingstone to further discussion. Markman
invented a system to track articles of clothing and associated business
transactions for use in the dry cleaning industry.8 6 Markman's claims
were drawn to an "inventory and control reporting system.""7
Westview produced and sold an electronic system capable of tracking
cash and invoice totals, but not articles of clothing.8 Markman sued
Westview, alleging that Westview's system, by virtue of tracking cash
and invoices, fulfilled Markman's claim requirement of tracking
"inventory."89 Westview countered that cash and invoices do not
constitute "inventory."'  Thus, Markman argued for a broad
definition of the term "inventory," while Westview maintained that the
term narrowly referred to articles of clothing.4
The Federal Circuit agreed with Westview's interpretation for
reasons grounded in the Court's analysis of Markman's claim
34. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.Sd 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that prosecution history included arguments made by
applicant's attorney during the 'give and take' process of obtaining a patent (citing Unique
Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1991))), aifid, 116
S. Ct. 1384 (1997). The Federal Circuit has made clear since Markman that the prosecution
history is to be viewed broadly, encompassing not only attorney argument, but also such other
sources as information disclosure statements ("IDS") submitted during prosecution. SeeEkchian
v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1803, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(concluding that "an IDS is part of the prosecution history on which the examiner, the Courts,
and the public are entitled to rely").
35. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331 (noting usefulness of
extrinsic evidence, especially expert testimony, to "explain scientific principles, the meaning of
technical terms, and terms of art").
36. See id. at 971-73, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-24 (describing problems related to dry
cleaning industry and Markman's patented inventions).
37. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1322-24.
38. See id at 972-73,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324 (detailing mechanics of the DATAMARK
and DATASCAN systems).
39. See id. at 972-74, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25 (contesting the district court's grant
ofjudgrnent as a matter of law in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
40. See id, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324-25; id. at 979-83, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-33
(reaching a definition of "inventory" by focusing on patent and prosecution history).
41. See id. at 981-83, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-33.
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language, specification, and prosecution history.42 First, Markman's
claim recited a system that was to "detect and localize spurious
additions to inventory as well as spurious deletions therefrom." "
The Federal Circuit noted that cash and invoice totals "are not
'localized' because dollars do not travel through the cleaning process
and the location of invoices is irrelevant."'  Thus, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the claim language itself makes little sense if
Markman's proposed broad interpretation of the term "inventory" is
correct.45
Second, the Federal Circuit noted that the specification was
"pervasive" in using the term "inventory" with overt reference to
articles of clothing, and cited several passages in the specification to
this effect.46 Third, the Federal Circuit pointed to the patent's
prosecution history, in which Markman, among other things,
specifically added limitations to its claims that intrinsically related the
term "inventory" to "articles [of clothing]" in order to overcome a
rejection on grounds of obviousness over the prior art.47 Finally, the
Federal Circuit refused to give any deference to Markman's expert
testimony as to the broad interpretation of "inventory" because it was
irreconcilable with the overwhelming evidence proffered by the
language of the claim, the specification, and the file history.'
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM INTERPRETATION
A. Claim Terms Will Be Given Their Conventional Meaning When They
Are Not Otherwise Defined in the Specification
It is well established in U.S. patent practice that a patent applicant
can attribute whatever meaning to a claim term he chooses, so long
as the term is clearly defined in the specification, and the definition
is used consistently throughout the specification and claims. 9 This
42. See id at 979-83, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-33 (rejecting Markman's contention that
the jury properly considered all the evidence concerning the disputed claim term in reaching
the conclusion that the term does not require articles of clothing).
43. Id. at 971, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
44. Id. at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
45. See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (refusing to allow extrinsic evidence introduced
by Markman to change the meaning of the claims).
46. See id. at 982, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331-32 ("The specification is pervasive in using
the term 'inventory' to consist of 'articles of clothing.'").
47. See id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1332 (noting Markman's comments to the examiner that
the "applicant's system is operable to keep a running reconcilable inventory total by adding
input articles and subtracting output articles, and also protects against the possibility of
undocumented... articles entering the system").
48. See id. at 983, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
49. See MPEP, supra note 19, §§ 2111.01, 2173.01.
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basic principle is often expressed as the general rule that "an
applicant may be his or her own lexicographer as long as the meaning
assigned to the term is not repugnant to the term's well known
usage."5" However, if a patentee does not assign an unconventional
meaning to a claim term during prosecution, a court will interpret
that term during litigation as having its conventionally accepted
meaning to one of skill in the art. 1 As the Federal Circuit pointed
out in Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc.,52
"So long as the meaning of an expression is made reasonably
clear and its use is consistent within a patent disclosure, an inventor
is permitted to define the terms of his claims. Nevertheless, the
place to do so is in the specification of the inventor's application,
and the time to do so is prior to that application acquiring its own
independent life as a technical disclosure through its issuance as a
United States patent. The litigation-induced pronouncements of
[the inventor] ... have no effect on what the words of that
document in fact do convey and have conveyed during its term to
the public."53
The following examples illustrate and elaborate on this basic
principle, both with respect to ordinary words in common usage and
technical terms of art.
1. "Ordinary" terms
Consistent with the general rule recited above, an ordinary,
nontechnical term has generally been accorded its plain meaning by
the Federal Circuit unless the specification or prosecution history
indicates otherwise. 4 A patentee's failure to adopt, either through
explicit definition or clear usage, an unconventional meaning in the
specification will preclude later arguments by the patentee that an
alternative definition is correct5 5  Expert testimony is unlikely to
50. See id.; see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("'The dictionary does not always keep abreast of inventors.
It cannot. Things are not made for the sake of words but words for things. To overcome this
lag, patent law allows the inventor to be his own lexicographer.'" (quoting Autogiro Co. of Am.
v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967))).
51. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330.
52. 952 F.2d 1384, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
53. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388,21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383,
1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 733 F.2d 881, 889, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1025, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
54. See id. at 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385 ("[W]here a disputed term would be
understood to have its ordinary meaning by one of skill in the art from the patent and its
history, extrinsic evidence that the inventor may have subjectively intended a different meaning
does not preclude summary judgment.").
55. See id, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (stating that time for adoptions is prior to patent
issuance).
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persuade a court that it should adopt a contrary meaning, especially
when the specification and prosecution history employ the term in a
conventional manner.
5 6
For example, Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allen Medical Industries, Inc. 7
involved the mechanism by which a novel surgical stapler advances
along an incision to insert staples.58 The patentee's claim recited the
phrase "to place a forwardmost staple on said anvil surface .... "11
The accused stapler, by contrast, utilized an advancing mechanism
that placed the forwardmost staple above, rather than in physical
contact with, the stapler's anvil surface.' ° The patentee argued that
the term "on" actually meant "juxtaposed," and thus did not limit the
claim to require actual contact." The inventor offered testimony to
this effect at trial.62 The defendant, understandably, argued the
opposite point of view.'
The Federal Circuit found that three different sources supported
the defendant's position. First, the dictionary defined "on" as
"position of contact," while "juxtaposed" was defined as "side by
side."' Second, the specification offered no contrary definition of
its own for the term "on."' Third, the prosecution history showed
that the patentee in fact required "close adjacency" (i.e., "on") as a
necessary limitation to distinguish over prior art.6 6 In view of this
evidence, the Federal Circuit found that the expert testimony offered
by the patentee to broaden the definition of "on" "was of little if any
significance."67 The court further stated the more general proposi-
tion, quoted with approval in Vitronics and in its predecessor post-
Markman case Southwall Technologies,' that "an inventor may not be
heard to proffer an interpretation that would alter the undisputed
56. See id., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (noting that the existence of extrinisic evidence
that the inventor might have subjectively intended a different meaning does not preclude
summaryjudgment).
57. 888 F.2d 815, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
58. Senmed, Inc. v. Richard-Allen Med. Indus., Inc., 888 F.2d 815, 816, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1508, 1509 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
59. Id at 816, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1509 (emphasis added).
60. See id. at 817, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1510.
61. See id. at 819, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
62. See id., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
63. See id., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
64. Id. at 819-20 n.9, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512-13 n.9 (quoting WEBsrER's NEW
COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 623, 1276 (1979)).
65. Id. at 817-18, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
66. See id., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
67. Id- at 817 n.8, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512 n.8 (finding expert testimony irrelevant as
to definition of "on").
68. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (expressing the principle that the prosecution
history and intrinsic evidence of the claim should be sufficient to put a competitor skilled in the
art on notice as what is claimed under the patent).
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public record (claim, specification, prosecution history) and treat the
claim as a 'nose of wax.'-
69
By contrast, in Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve,
Inc.,71 the decisive issue was the proper interpretation of the term
"smooth."71  The patentee developed a novel process for etching
identifying marks on contact lenses. 7 A major problem that needed
to be solved in the art was how to etch the lens in a manner that
would eliminate the eye irritation otherwise caused by rough surfaces
formed on the lens as a result of conventional etching processes.7"
The patentee solved the problem by supplying a "smooth surface of
unsublimated polymer material" that surrounded etched areas of the
lens.74 When the defendant produced and marketed a similar lens,
the patentee filed suit. Barnes-Hind defended its position by showing
that under a scanning electron microscope, its lenses were not, in
fact, "smooth" (as conventionally defined), as required by the
patentee's claim.75 The Federal Circuit rejected the argument,
noting that "resort to the specification clearly demonstrates that
'smooth' meant that 'the edges of the craters neither inflame nor
irritate the eyelid of the lens wearer,'" a definition satisfied by the
defendant's lens.7' The specification's apparent linkage of the term
"smooth" to its function in the invention saved the patentee from
being limited to a puritanically conventional usage of the term.
77
2. Technical terms
The general proposition that claim terms are accorded their
ordinary meaning to one of skill in the art unless otherwise defined
in the specification applies to technical terms of art as well. However,
the inquiry into how one of skill in the art would conventionally
69. Senmed, 888 F.2d at 819 n.8, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512 n.8. For another example
where the Federal Circuit found recourse in a simple dictionary definition dispositive of a claim
term's interpretation, see Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 n.8, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1936, 1938 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding use of the term "strau-shaped" in claim
"imposes the requirement that the channel-forming elements be hollow" based on Webster's
New World Dictionary's definition of "straw" as "hollow stalks or stems of grain after threshing").
70. 796 F.2d 443, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 416 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
71. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443,450,230 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 416, 421 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
72. See id. at 445, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 417.
73. See id., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 417.
74. See id., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 417.
75. See id. at 450, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 421.
76. See id., 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 421.
77. The Federal Circuit's recourse to usage of a claim term in the context of function can
also be seen at work, albeit with opposite results as to a literal infringement finding, in the post-
Markman case, Ethicon Endo-Surgerj, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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understand a claim term can be somewhat more complex than for
ordinary terms. The post-Markman cases of Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc.'s and Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.
79
provide considerable guidance as to how the Federal Circuit interprets
technical terms of art.
In Vitronics, the patentee had invented a method for soldering
electrical devices to circuit boards.80 At issue was the proper
interpretation of the claim phrase "solder reflow temperature."81
The patentee (Vitronics) argued that the phrase should be construed
to mean "the temperature reached by the solder during the period it
is reflowing during the final stages of the soldering process ... 82
On the other hand, the accused infringer (Conceptronic) argued that
the phrase "the liquidus temperature of a particular type of solder
known as 63/37 (Sn/Pb) solder" should be construed as the
temperature at which a particular solder first begins to melt (183
degrees Celsius)."' Under the accused infringer's definition, there
could be no literal infringement, since the method used by
Conceptronic employed a higher temperature.
Conceptronic offered expert testimony and other extrinsic evidence
in the form of technical literature articles in support of its defini-
tion. 4 The Federal Circuit, however, found Conceptronic's extrinsic
evidence unconvincing in light of its analysis of Vitronics' intrinsic
evidence in the form of its specification:
[T] he "peak reflow temperature" and "liquidus temperature" are
clearly defined in the specification as having distinctly different
meanings .... Moreover, in the preferred embodiment described
in the patent, the solder is heated to a temperature of 210
[degrees] .... Therefore, in order to be consistent with the
specification and preferred embodiment described therein, [the
claim at issue] must be construed such that the term "solder reflow
temperature" means the peak reflow temperature, rather than the
liquidus temperature. Indeed, if "solder reflow temperature" were
defined to mean liquidus temperature, a preferred (and indeed
only) embodiment in the specification would not fall within the
scope of the patent claim. Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever,
78. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
79. 54 F.3d 1570, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
80. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576,1579-80,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573,
1574 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
81. Id at 1579-80, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
82. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
83. See id. at 1580, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1574.
84. See id. at 1584-85, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578-79.
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correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support,
which is wholly absent in this case.85
The Vitronics case thus illustrates the preferred recourse by the
Federal Circuit to intrinsic evidence in the interpretation of technical
terms of art. Moreover, the case also illustrates the basic precept of
claim interpretation that claims will generally not be construed in a
manner that excludes the patentee's preferred embodiments disclosed
in its specification.
In Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,86 the patentee
claimed a novel heat mirror useful as a window glazing material.8s
Heat mirrors "generally comprise [] one or morethin layers of silver,
which are transparent to visible light but reflect heat, spaced apart by
a layer of dielectric material ... that decreases the reflection and
increases the transmission of visible light."'
At issue was the proper interpretation of the phrase "wherein the
dielectric is a sputter-deposited dielectric." 9 If the sputter-depositing
process broadly encompassed either a one- or two-step process, then
Cardinal's heat mirror infringed Southwall's claim. If, on the other
hand, the claimed sputter-depositing process encompassed only a
narrow, single-step process, Cardinal's heat mirror did not literally
infringe. Relying on Southwall's prosecution history as dispositive of
the proper claim interpretation, the district court concluded as a
matter of law that Cardinal's heat mirror did not infringe Southwall's
claim.90
The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that "the prosecution
history limits the interpretation of 'sputter-deposited dielectric' layer
to exclude any dielectric layer formed by the two-step process."91 As
explained by the court, Southwall had "amended an independent
claim to describe the dielectric as a 'sputter-deposited inorganic metal
oxide, compound or salt,'" 92 to claim the process described in its
specification, which utilizes "processes in which the metal is sputtered
off of a metal target and directly converted to the oxide ..... and thereby
distinguish the prior arty3 The Federal Circuit thus reasoned, "[i] n
85. Id. at 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1577-78.
86. 54 F.3d 1570, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see supra notes 15, 78 and
accompanying text.
87. Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1573, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1673, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
88. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674.
89. Id. at 1574, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
90. See id. at 1575, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
91. Id. at 1576, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
92. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
93. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
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[its] response Southwall necessarily disclaimed the examiner's
interpretation of 'sputter-deposited' metal oxides as encompassing a
two-step process in which metal is first deposited as a metal and then
oxidized."94 Moreover, in response to Southwall's contention that
the arguments it made with respect to certain claims did not
necessarily apply to others, the Federal Circuit noted that:
"Sputter-deposited dielectric" cannot be interpreted differently in
different claims because claim terms must be interpreted consis-
tently. Interpretation of a disputed claim term requires reference
not only to the specification and prosecution history, but also to
other claims. The fact that we must look to other claims using the
same term when interpreting a term in an asserted claim mandates
that the term be interpreted consistently in all claims.95
The Federal Circuit thus reiterated the precept of claim interpretation
that "arguments made during prosecution regarding the meaning of
a claim term are relevant to the interpretation of that term in every
claim of the patent absent a clear indication to the contrary."96
In view of the conclusive interpretation that could be achieved
through recourse to Southwall's prosecution history, the Federal
Circuit rejected Southwall's proffered expert testimony regarding
whether Cardinal's dielectric layer could be characterized as a sputter-
deposited dielectric as providing merely conclusory legal opinions.97
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of
no infringement. 8
It is instructive to compare the Federal Circuit's treatment of expert
testimony regarding the meaning of a technical term in Southwallwith
its treatment of expert testimony in the pre-Markman case, Moeller v.
lonetics, Inc.99 In Moeller, the patentee claimed a novel electrode
system for detecting ions."°° The accused infringer, Ionetics, argued
that the Ionetics electrode protruded from the "electrode body"
housing the electrode, whereas the patentee Moeller's claims called
for an electrode disposed within said body."' Moeller's expert
explained that the term "electrode" is itself ambiguous and can be
94. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
95. I at 1579, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679 (internal citations omitted).
96. 1&, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
97. See id. at 1578, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R.
Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 797, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
98. See id at 1576,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (holding that, as a matter of law, Cardinal's
product did not infringe).
99. 794 F.2d 653, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 992 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
100. Moeller v. Ionetics, Inc., 794 F.2d 653, 654-55, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 992, 993 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
101. See id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 993-94 (emphasis added).
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understood to encompass either the sensing tip of the electrode, the
entire length of the conducting wire of the electrode, or the entire
electrode system.102 Neither the specification nor anything in the
prosecution history specified which was the intended definition.
103
Clearly, if either of the latter two definitions were correct, infringe-
ment could be found.' °4
In granting Ionetics's motion for partial summary judgment of
noninfringement, the lower court refused to consider the expert's
testimony, reasoning that the patentee's claim and the accused device
were "sufficiently simple to be understood without the aid of
experts.""°5 The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that while the
use of expert testimony is generally at the trial judge's discretion, in
this case "the meanings of key terms in the claim were clearly
disputed."0 6 "In a patent case involving complex scientific princi-
ples," the court reasoned, "it is particularly helpful to see how those
skilled in the art would interpret the claim."
107
In the wake of Markman and its progeny, and in view of Southwall
in particular, the statement in Moeller that cases involving complex
technology require a court to consider expert testimony as to how one
of skill in the art would interpret a claim, and that a court's failure to
do so is an abuse of discretion, 08 is put into question.0 9
Nevertheless, in the post-Markman case, Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP
Chemicals Ltd.," ° the Federal Circuit treated expert testimony "as
cumulative to the other evidence, and as enlarging our understanding
of the technology and the usage of the disputed [claim] terms.""'
At issue in Hoechst was the meaning of the term "stable" in regard to
a method for removing iodide compounds from a non-aqueous
102. See id. at 657, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 994.
103. See id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 994.
104. See id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 994-95.
105. Id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 995.
106. Id, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 994.
107. Id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 995. Indeed, the court concluded that "the trial judge's
failure to allow such testimony was an abuse of discretion." Id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 995.
108. See id., 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 995.
109. As the court pointed out in Markman:
When legal "experts" offer their conflicting views of how the patent should be
construed, or where the legal expert's view of how the patent should be construed
conflicts with the patent document itself, such conflict does not create a question of
fact nor can the expert opinion bind the court or relieve the court of its obligation to
construe the claims according to the tenor of the patent.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967,983,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,1333 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), af'd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
110. 78 F.3d 1575, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
111. Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. BP Chems. Ltd., 78 F.3d 1575, 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1126, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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organic medium, which required a "resin which is stable in the
organic medium ... ,"112 As Hoechst's specification defined
"stable" as meaning "[t]hat the resin will not chemically decompose,
or change more than about 50 percent of its dry physical dimension
upon being exposed to the organic medium containing the iodide
compounds," ' the claim interpretation issue revolved around the
meaning of the term "dimension." BP argued that "dry physical
dimension" refered to volume and, thus, its process did not in-
fringe."4  According to Hoechst, however, "dimension" is a linear
measure and, therefore, did give rise to infringement."'
Hoechst and BP proffered conflicting expert testimony as to the
conventional art definition of "dimension," and both parties offered
dictionary definitions supporting their respective positions.1 1 6 The
district court found Hoechst's expert "highly credible," and further
reasoned that BP's definition would exclude Hoechst's preferred
embodiment described in its specification." 7 Accordingly, the lower
court found literal infringement.11
In reviewing the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit noted
that
This court has occasionally relied on general and technical
dictionaries to determine the meaning of technical and other
terms. In this case the dictionaries do not distinguish in a
dispositive manner between the contested technical meanings.
Further, a general dictionary definition is secondary to the specific
meaning of a technical term as it is used and understood in a
particular technical field."9
The court then quoted from Hoechst's expert's testimony, observing
that "[a]lthough we are at a disadvantage in attempting to make
credibility determinations, the inventor's testimony reads as that of an
expert in the field."'2° The court continued by stating that although
112. Id. at 1578, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
113. Id. at 1578-79, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 1579, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
115. See id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
116. See id. at 1579-80, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129-30. Hoechst presented the definition
of "dimension" as "measure in one direction ... (specifically) one of three coordinates
determining a position in space or four coordinates determining a position in space and time."
WEBsrE's COLLEGIATE DICtIONARY 355 (1988). BP presented the definition of "dimension" as
"a measurable extent of any kind, as length, breadth, depth, area, and volume." CONCISE
OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT ENGLISH 327 (8th ed. 1990).
117. See id. at 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
118. See id. at 1577, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128.
119. Id. at 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (citing Hormone Research Found., Inc., v.
Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1563, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1043-44 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
120. Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130 (citing Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 976,
226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5, 9 (Fed. Cir. 1985), ovemued on other grounds by Markman v. Westview
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"Markman requires us to give no deference to the testimony of the
inventor about the meaning of the claims.... [W]e have treated
[the inventor's] testimony as cumulative to the other evidence, and
as enlarging our understanding of the technology and the usage of
the disputed terms."12 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court's holding of infringement.1
The Federal Circuit, thus, even post-Markman, clearly has not
precluded consideration of expert testimony as a claim interpretation
tool. It may sometimes be necessary to rely on expert testimony to
establish the conventional meaning of a technical term of art when
intrinsic evidence is absent. It appears more likely to be relied upon
when it is cumulative of other evidence." It is difficult, however, to
articulate a bright line rule as to when expert testimony will be judged
mere opinion that carries no weight, and when it will be considered
as "enlarging [the court's] understanding of the technology and the
usage of ... disputed [claim] terms."124
In closing this discussion, it is interesting to consider the question
of at what point in time the Federal Circuit will judge the convention-
al meaning of a claim term. In other words, will the conventional
meaning be ascertained as of the time of filing a patent application,
or at the time of infringement, It could be argued that insofar as the
patentee's intent as to the meaning of a claim term is generally
dispositive of a claim interpretation, the meaning of the term as of
filing will control. As the Federal Circuit's decision in United States
Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co." appears to show, however, tech-
nical terms used conventionally by a patentee can take on an
increasingly broad scope over time as the relevant art gradually
recognizes that term as conventionally encompassing a concomitantly
wider scope of embodiments. 26 Indeed, claims reciting such technical
terms may become enforceable by the patentee against unforeseen
embodiments never even contemplated by the patentee in the
specification. In Phillips Petroleum, the Federal Circuit justified such
practice, reasoning that "[a] patent applicant is not required.., to
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd 116
S. Ct. 1384 (1996)).
121. Id., 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
122. See id at 1581, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130, af'g 846 F. Supp. 542, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1825 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
123. See id. at 1580, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
124. Id, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1130.
125. 865 F.2d 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
126. See United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1252, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (illustrating that the meaning of technical claim
terms may be expanded over time).
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predict every possible variation, improvement[,] or commercial
embodiment of his invention." 27 A brief look at the Phillips Petro-
leum case will help clarify this curious situation.
In the early 1950s, Phillips Petroleum filed a patent application for
crystalline polypropylene. 2 8 Over the years, crystalline poly-propylene
has become a ubiquitous product in the chemical industry because of
its tough, stress-resistant, yet malleable properties that make it highly
suitable for a wide variety of molding and packaging applications.
129
Phillips' claim at issue recited: "Normally solid polypropylene,
consisting essentially of recurring propylene units, having a substantial
crystalline polypropylene content""a  Phillips charged U.S. Steel with
patent infringement for producing and selling a particular form of
crystalline polypropylene.' As a defense, U.S. Steel countered that
its crystalline polypropylene was of higher molecular weight and
viscosity that any of the crystalline polypropylene molecules described
in Phillips' patent. Accordingly, U.S. Steel argued, Phillips' claim was
not entitled to Phillips' earliest filing date of 1953, because the 1953
application and claim did not comply with the written description
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. 2 Intervening
prior art therefore rendered Phillips' claim invalid as anticipated
under 35 U.S.C. § 102.1'
It was uncontested that Phillips did not disclose in its 1953
specification a crystaline polypropylene form having the physical
properties of U.S. Steel's product."5 In fact, the U.S. Steel product
'was neither known in the art at the time Phillips filed its patent
application nor even contemplated in theory as being commercially
viable or important. 5
Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding
of both validity and infringement 8 6 The Federal Circuit quoted In
re Koller for the proposition that "'language in a specification is to be
understood for what it meant to one having ordinary skill in the art
at the time the application was filed' and noting that support need be
127. Id at 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (alteration in original).
128. See id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
129. See id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463-64.
130. i& at 1249, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463 (emphasis added).
131. See id. at 1248, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462.
132. See id at 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (U.S. Steel contending that the rule of law
is "[i]f [a claim] embraces subject matter for which no adequate basis exists in the underlying
disclosure, the claim is too broad").
133. See id. at 1248-49, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1462-63.
134. See id. at 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1463.
135. See id. at 1252, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465.
136. See id. at 1254, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
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found for only the claimed invention, in view of how one skilled in
the art at that time would construe the claims and would read its
specification."137 The Federal Circuit then pointed out that whether
the claim at issue "may cover a later version of the claimed composi-
tion (crystalline polypropylene with higher intrinsic viscosity and
average molecular weight) relates to infringement, not patentability,"
and that "[c]ertainly, the disclosure of specifics adds to the under-
standing one skilled in the art would glean from a generic term, but
it does not follow that such added disclosure limits the meaning
thereof."1"
While the issue in Phillips was claim validity, the case can, in
essence, embrace later embodiments not originally contemplated by
the term at the time of an application's filing date, so long as at the
time of filing, the claim was commensurate in scope with the
disclosure, and the claim term, by virtue of its later-developed
conventional meaning (i.e., at the time of infringement) embraces an
accused product or process.
3. Imprecise claim terms
As the Federal Circuit pointed out in Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel
Electronics, Inc.,"a imprecise claim terms are ubiquitous in patent
claims."4 "Such [terms], when serving reasonably to describe the
claimed subject matter to those of skill in the field of the invention,
and to distinguish the claimed subject matter from the prior art, have
been accepted in patent examination and upheld by the courts."'41
As to the question of the extent of a claim's expansion in scope
afforded by use of imprecise claim terms, the Federal Circuit noted
in Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc." that "[t]he use of the word
'about' avoids a strict numerical boundary to the specified parameter.
Its range must be determined in its technologic and stylistic context
... [including] the patent specification, the prosecution history, and
other claims.""
137. 1& at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (quoting In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 824, 204
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 702, 706 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
138. See id. at 1251-52, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1466.
139. 847 F.2d 819, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
140. SeeAndrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2010,
2012 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
141. Id, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
142. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
143. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1229 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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The reference in Pall to the specification, prosecution history, and
other claims suggests that the modus operandi used by the Federal
Circuit in interpreting imprecise claim terms is, in essence, not any
different from that employed in interpreting other terms. The case
of Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLCM lends further credence to this
proposition. Rodime attempted to amend a claim during a reexami-
nation proceeding." By statute, claim scope cannot be expanded in
any manner. during such a proceeding.' Rodime's original claim
included the phrase "at least 600 tracks per inch" ("tpi").147 During
reexamination, however, Rodime amended the claim to recite "at least
approximately 600 tpi."'4
The court held that the amendment was in violation of 35 U.S.C.
§ 305 because it expanded the scope of the original claim. 49 In
particular, the court pointed out that, according to Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, "approximately" means "'reasonably close
to.' 150 Therefore, as opposed to the original claim, which had a
precise lower limit, the amended claim "defined an open-ended range
starting slightly below 600."
151
In Conopco Inc. v. May Department Stores, Inc., 52 the Federal Circuit
needed to determine not only whether an imprecise claim term
expanded claim scope per se, but also whether the expansion of claim
scope afforded by the imprecise claim was sufficient to ensnare an
accused infringer.15 3  The patentee (Conopco) argued for an
expansive interpretation of the phrase "about 40:1" (referring to a
chemical ratio) in order to obtain a decision of literal infringement
as to May's material having a ratio of 162.9:1.11 The court pointed
out that "the relevant inquiry.., is whether one of skill in the art
would have understood that the term was to be used expansively."'55
The court rejected Conopco's position because "the specification and
prosecution history do not support the argument that the inventors
144. 65 F.3d 1577, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
145. Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1579,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1162, 1164
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
146. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
147. See Quantum Corp., 65 F.3d at 1579, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163-64.
148. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
149. See id. at 1581, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
150. M, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (quoting WFBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORLD DICIoNARY
107 (1986)).
151. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166 (emphasis added).
152. 46 F.3d 1556, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
153. SeeConopco Inc. v. May Dep't Stores, Inc., 46 F.3d 1556, 1560-61,32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
154. See id. at 1561, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
155. M, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
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used this term differently from its ordinary meaning." 5 The court
looked to a standard dictionary to find the "ordinary meaning" of the
term "about," and concluded that its meaning was "approximate-
ly." 15 7  As such, the four-fold higher ratio of the accused material
was held to be clearly out of range of "about 40:1," as one of ordinary
skill in the art "would have no reason to believe that the term 'about'
meant other than what it says."
158
While the Federal Circuit was able to dispose of Conopco by simple
recourse to a dictionary definition, the reference in Pall to "techno-
logic and stylistic context" extends the interpretative process beyond
this simple recourse to an inquiry into how one of skill in the relevant
art would understand the range imparted by an imprecise claim term
when viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history.'
As articulated by the Federal Circuit in Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial
Crating & Packing, Inc." years before the Pall decision:
when a word of degree is used, the district court must determine
whether the patent's specification provides some standard for
measuring that degree. The trial court must decide, that is,
whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand what is
claimed when the claim is read in light of the specification.'
61
Functional criteria given in the specification can serve as indices of
"technologic context." For example, in Seattle Box, the court needed
to interpret the phrase "substantially equal to or greater than the
thickness of the tier of pipe lengths" as applied to certain divider
blocks, in order to assess a claim's validity in light of the accused
infringer's assertion of indefiniteness. 162  In making its determina-
tion, the court noted that the specification elaborated that "the
156. Id., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227. The "ordinary meaning" of the term "about" was
held by the court to be its dictionary definition, "approximately." See id. at 1561 n.2, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227 n.2; see also WEBsTER's THD NEiv INTERNATIONAL DicrIONARY 5
(1981). As such, the four-fold higher ratio of the accused material was held to be clearly out
of range of "about 40:1." See Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1561, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
Interpretations that include ranges up to two times a particular value have, however, been
upheld. See, eg., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446,1455, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191,
1199 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding "at least about 108 liters/mole" literally infringed by 4.8 x 107
liters/mole and 7.1 to 7.5 x 107 liters/mole).
157. See Conopco, 46 F.3d at 1561, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
158. See id., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1228.
159. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1225, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
160. 731 F.2d 818, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
161. Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826, 221 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 568, 571 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d
1540, 1547, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1, 7 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that "'close proximity' is as
precise as the subject matter permits").
162. See Seattle Box, 731 F.2d at 821-22, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 571.
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divider blocks are intended to absorb the weight of overhead
loads."" Accordingly, thickness values that do not meet this
functional criterion would not infringe the claim reciting the term
"substantially equal to."" One of skill in the art could thus deter-
mine from the claim language what did, and did not, infringe the
claim." The court, therefore, affirmed the district court's finding of
claim validity.
16
That one of skill in the art could determine whether a product or
process infringes a claim with an imprecise claim term based on a
reading of the claim language in light of the specification bespeaks
recourse to fact finding on this issue. Interestingly, the Federal
Circuit in the post-Markman case, Modine Manufacturing Co. v. United
States International Trade Commission,67 has lent credence to this
proposition.
In Modine, the claim at issue was drawn to a condenser used in
automobile air conditioners." The claim recited, in relevant part,
"flow paths being of relatively small hydraulic diameter."6 9 Several
Japanese companies manufactured condensers in Japan and imported
them into and sold them in the United States. 7 ' Modine charged
these companies with violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act.' The
record showed that the accused Japanese products had hydraulic
diameters of between 0.0424 and 0.0682 inches.7 2 The International
Trade Commission ("ITC") held that "relatively small," as recited in
Modine's claim at issue, had an upper limit of 0.040, and accordingly
held no infringement either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. 73 Modine then appealed to the Federal Circuit.
163. Id at 826, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 574.
164. Id., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 574.
165. See id., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 573-74.
166. See id., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 573-74. The court also noted that a claim may be held
valid even if some experimentation would be required to determine whether a particular value
within a range marked by an imprecise claim term meets a particular functional requirement.
See id., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 574. In this regard, it is interesting to note that in Pal, the court
suggested that "it is appropriate to consider the effects of varying (a] parameter" in construing
the scope afforded by imprecise claim terms. SeePall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d
1211, 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
167. 75 F.3d 1545, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
168. See Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1549, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
169. Id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
170. See id. at 1548, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
171. See id, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (charging importation of automotive condensers
by the Japanese companies that manufactured them violated section 337 of the Tariff Act, 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (1994)).
172. See id. at 1554, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
173. See id. at 1550-51, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1612.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit noted that insofar as the hydraulic
diameter range described in the grandparent specification was
reduced in the parent and child applications from 0.070 inches (in
the grandparent) to 0.040 inches (in the parent and child), a
construction embracing diameters up to 0.070 inches was preclud-
ed. 4 However, the Federal Circuit also noted that:
The specification uses the qualifier "about," and also states that
the optimum hydraulic diameter varies with the conditions. Such
broadening usages as "about" must be given reasonable scope; they
must be viewed by the decisionmaker as they would be understood
by persons experienced in the field of the invention. Although it
is rarely feasible to attach a precise limit to "about," the usage can
usually be understood in light of the technology embodied in the
invention. When the claims are applied to an accused device, it is
a question of technologic fact whether the accused device meets a
reasonable meaning of "aboue' in the particular circumstances.-
Moreover, citing various precedents, the Federal Circuit explicitly
observed that "[p]recedent illustrates the fact-dependency of
determinations of the technologic scope of 'about' and similar terms,
depending on their context and the precision or significance of the
measurements used.""6 Because the ITC failed to consider "the
effect of relevant factors such as the nature of the coolant and the
precision of the measurement,"'77 the Federal Circuit vacated the
judgment below and remanded the case for consideration of whether
the accused devices literally infringed the claims.
78
Such a factual determination as to whether a particular set of values
fell within the purview of an imprecise claim term was dispositive in
Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,179 a case cited by the Modine
court.' In affirming the lower court's issuance of a preliminary
injunction against the accused infringer, Abbott Laboratories, the
Federal Circuit reviewed whether Hybritech had established a
reasonable likelihood of success at proving infringement of
Hybritech's claim for a monoclonal antibody sandwich diagnostic kit
that required antibodies having an affinity of "at least about 108
liters/mole." ' The district court made the factual finding that the
174. See id. at 1554, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614-15.
175. I., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (internal citations omitted).
176. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
177. Id. at 1554-55, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
178. See id. at 1555, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615.
179. 849 F.2d 1446, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
180. See Modine, 75 F.2d at 1554, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1615 (citing Hybritech Inc. v.
Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1455, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
181. Hyritech, 849 F.2d at 1455, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
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term "about" as used in Hybritech's claim encompassed a two- to
three-fold measurement error (presumably inherent in the relevant
art), and as such, found that Abbott's accused products fell within the
literal scope of the claim.
182
Recourse to factual findings as suggested in Modine and as illustrat-
ed by the decision in Hybritech suggests that expert testimony may be
able to play a role in deciding infringement issues based on a claim
interpretation of imprecise claim terms, even in the post-Markman era.
Additional credence for this proposition is provided in the post-
Markman case Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc.l"3
In Pal4 the patentee (Pall) claimed materials having a substance
ratio of "about 5:1 to about 7:1." 1 The accused material had a
ratio of 4:1.1' The court found no literal infringement because Dr.
Pall, the inventor, testified that the ratio of 3:1 was purposely
excluded from the claim, based on experiments showing that the only
commercially available material having this ratio did not have certain
requisite functional properties, whereas materials having a 5:1 ratio
did have these properties."8 6 No experiments were conducted in the
range of 3:1 to 5:1, however.87 In effect, Dr. Pall had placed the
lower limit of operability of the invention at 5:1.1' Citing Markman
for the proposition that "[e]xtrinsic evidence of meaning and usage
in the art may be helpful in determining the criticality of the
parameter [at issue], and may be received from the inventor and
others skilled in the field of the invention,"'89 the court found that
4:1 was not intended by the patentee and, therefore, was excluded
from the range of "about 5:1 to about 7:1." 1 °
The utility of expert testimony in persuading a court as to a
particular claim interpretation of an imprecise claim term should,
however, be viewed with caution. First, the inventor's testimony in
Pall was akin to a declaration against interest, and thus was perhaps
intrinsically more believable to the court. 9 ' Second, the Pall decision
182. See id., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1199.
183. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
184. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1229 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
185. See id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
186. See id. at 1217-18, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
187. See id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
188. See id. at 1218, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
189. I at 1217, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229 (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995), ajfld, 116 S. Ct. 1384
(1996)).
190. Id at 1217-18, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229.
191. See i&L, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229. Dr. Pall's testimony that nylon with a ratio of 3:1
to 5:1 was never tested because it was not commercially available at the time and that the "claims
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preceded the dictum in Vitronics warning that expert testimony is
likely to play a role in only rare circumstances. 92 Third, even pre-
Markman decisions have made clear that expert opinions may be
insufficient to convince a court that a particular interpretation of an
imprecise claim term is correct.193
For example, in WL. Gore & Associates Inc. v. Garlock Inc.,'14 the
patentee (Gore) claimed a material having a stretch rate of "about
100% per second.""5 The accused material was held not to infringe
because the patentee offered as the only evidence for its broad
interpretation of "about" expert opinion testimony setting a range of
76.5% to 139%.196 The court found that this expert testimony was
inadequate to sustain the patentee's burden of proof of infringement
on a preponderance of the evidence standard."
While opportunities may remain for the effective use of expert
testimony in aiding the court's interpretation of imprecise claim
terms, those opportunities remain limited.
4. Alternative definitions
A particularly difficult situation arises when a specification supplies
two or more definitions of varying scope for a given claim term. As
a general principle, a court will interpret such a claim term as having
the narrowest definition. For example, in Genentech Inc. v. Wellcome
Foundation Ltd.,"9 8 the patentee (Genentech) charged Wellcome
Foundation and codefendants with infringement of its patent drawn
to recombinantly produced "human tissue plasminogen activator"
("hTPA7).'1 The allegedly infringing molecules were structurally
and functionally similar, but not identical, to the naturally occurring
hTPA claimed by Genentech."t A decisive issue in the case was how
were 'actually rather narrow'" had the effect of declarations against interest on his claim of
patent infringement. See id at 1218-20, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229-31.
192. See id. at 1216-17, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)at 1228-29 (stating that "[e]xtrinsic evidence of
meaning and usage" provided by experts may be accepted by the court as an interpretation aid
when needed).
193. SeeW.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1280, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Where the evidence of infringement consists merely of one
expert's opinion.... the district court is under no obligation to accept it.").
194. 842 F.2d 1275, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
195. W.L. Gore & Assocs. Inc. v. Garlock Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1280, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1277, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
196. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
197. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282.
198. 29 F.3d 1555, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
199. Genentech Inc. v. Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1559, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
200. See id. at 1569,31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172 (finding similarities in "binding function"
of each product insufficient to demonstrate patent infringement in light of "profound
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broadly to interpret hTPA-in particular, whether its definition was
limited to the exact sequence of the natural molecule, or whether the
definition also encompassed variants having particular structural and
functional properties.20 Despite Genentech's expert testimony that
a broad-scope definition was warranted, 2 the Federal Circuit chose
the former, narrower interpretation, 3 and as such, found no
infringement.2°
Genentech provided in its specification no fewer than four different
definitions for hTPA, each of a different scope.0 5 The Federal Circuit
reasoned that choosing the narrowest definition was the "appropriate
method to follow because it avoids the possibility of an applicant
obtaining in court a scope of protection which encompasses subject
matter that, through the conscious efforts of the applicant, the
[Patent Office] did not examine."205
In the post-Markman decision, Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince
Manufacturing, Inc.,2°7 the Federal Circuit reiterated the proposition
that a court will choose the narrowest among alternative definitions
for a claim term. The patentee (Athletic Alternatives) claimed a
generic sports racket having a novel stringing system, in which string
segments were fastened in a particular order and geometric pat-
tern.2" The claim language at issue in the dispute recited how the
relative distances (denoted d-) between individual string segments
were to be constructed:
[W] here at least said first ends of at least said first plurality of string
segments are secured to said frame at a distance d,... and where
said distance di varies between minimum distances for the first and
last string ends in said sequence and a maximum distance for a
string end between said first and last string ends in said se-
quence.2tu
differences in the[ir] properties and structure").
201. See id. at 156-65, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166-68 (detailing scope of issue to be
adjudicated).
202. See id. at 1564, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168 (summarizing thrust of appellant's expert
witness evidence).
203. See id., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1168.
204. See id. at 1569, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
205. See id. at 1563-64, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167 (characterizing four definitions as
(1) narrow structural definition, (2) broader structural definition, (3) even broader structural
definition, and (4) functional definition).
206. Id. at 1564, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167.
207. 73 F.3d 1573, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
208. See Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1575, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (detailing specifics of patentee's claims).
209. Id. at 1577, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
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The case turned on the interpretation of the phrase "varies
between."21°  Athletic Alternatives contended that the phrase
requires that a string racket needs to have at least two offset distances,
a minimum value and a maximum value." Prince argued that the
phrase should be interpreted more narrowly, to require at least three
offset distances: a minimum, a maximum, and at least one value in
between.212 Since Prince's racket only employed two offset distances,
it argued that its racket did not infringe Athletic Alternatives's
claim.
213
Athletic Alternatives did not supply a definition for the convention-
al term "between" in its specification, and the Federal Circuit,
predictably, chose to assign the ordinary, accepted meaning to the
term. 4 The dictionary supplied alternative definitions for "between,"
however, some supporting Athletic Alternatives and others supporting
Prince. 15 Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that the specification
and the prosecution history could themselves be construed as
supporting either party's position. 16
The Federal Circuit resolved the dilemma by accepting the
narrower definition, which required at least three offset distances, and
thus found for Prince. 7 In doing so, the Court based its reasonihg
on the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 2, which requires
that an applicant for a patent "'distinctly claim[] the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention. '"218 The purpose of
the requirement, noted the Federal Circuit, is "'to guard against
210. Id at 1578-79, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370.
211. See id. at 1580-81, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
212. See id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
213. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
214. See id. at 1578, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1370 (explaining that because there was no
indication that Athletic Alternatives "sought to assign claim terms anything but their ordinary
and accustomed meanings, those are the meanings that we must give them").
215. See id. at 1579-81, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72.
216. See id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1371-72. The Federal Circuit also attempted to resolve
the ambiguity by considering Athletic Alternatives's recourse to the "doctrine of claim
differentiation," which states that limitations in narrower claims cannot be imported into
broader ones. See id. at 1580, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. As such, the presence of narrower
claims containing particular limitations may allow the inference that the broader claims do not
contain these limitations. Athletic Alternatives contended that since one of its narrower claims
used the term "continuously" instead of "between," and since "continuously" clearly requires
more than two offset distances, "between" should, therefore, be construed broadly. See id., 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. However, the Federal Circuit pointed out that "continuously" is still
narrower than "between," even if"between" is taken to mean that at least three offset distances
are required. See i. at 1580-81, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372. The Federal Circuit therefore
rejected Athletic Alternatives's argument. See i. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
217. See id. at 1581-83, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372-74.
218. See id. at 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994))
(emphasis added).
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unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others
arising from uncertainty as to their [respective] right."'219 The
Federal Circuit concluded:
Were we to allow [Athletic Alternatives] successfully to assert the
broader of the two senses of "between" against Prince, we would
undermine the fair notice function of the requirement that the
patentee distinctly claim the subject matter disclosed in the patent
from which he can exclude others temporarily. Where there is an
equal choice between a broader and a narrower meaning of a
claim, and there is an enabling disclosure that indicates that the
applicant is at least entitled to a claim having the narrower
meaning, we consider the notice function of the claim to be best
served by adopting the narrower meaning.22°
As the above cases illustrate, alternative definitions should be
avoided. Technical terms with well-accepted meanings in the art
should generally be used in their normal manner, unless some unique
advantage is gained from a nonconventional definition, in which case
a single nonconventional definition should be dearly stated and
consistently used.
B. Limitations in the Specification Will Not Be Read into the Claims
As indicated in this Article's introduction, an applicant for a patent
need only describe in the specification a "best mode embodiment" of
the invention.22' The best mode embodiment will generally be a
detailed description of a product or process and may contain many
structural or process elements.222 An applicant need not claim each
of these elements.2" Indeed, an applicant may be able to claim the
invention in significantly broader terms than the best mode, provided
the broadly claimed invention is enabled by the specification.
2 24
219. 1i&, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance
Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)).
220. i, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1372.
221. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112.
222. See3 ANTHoNYW. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTs §§ 10:11, 10:17 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp.
1996) (indicating optimal method for describing patent's "best mode embodiment").
223. See id.
224. See id. § 10:18. During the examination process, the USPTO will assess whether broader
claims are enabled by the specification, and whether the broad claims encompass prior art. If
one of ordinary skill in the art could make and use embodiments encompassed by the broad
claim based on the best mode disclosure, and there is no material prior art, then the applicant
may be entitled to the broad claim. See Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524,
1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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1. Illustrations of the general rule
A case in point with respect to this proposition can be found in
Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp.2" The patentee (Cabot) claimed a
novel earplug made of polymeric foam that can rebound to its
original dimensions after being compressed.22 An earplug of this sort
can be inserted into the ear when compressed by one's fingers; after
the user lets go, the earplug expands to form a comfortable and
virtually complete seal of the ear canal.227 The claims at issue recited
such an earplug, composed of "a resilient plasticized polymeric foam
having a sufficiently high concentration of organic plasticizer" to
enable a rate of expansion falling within certain defined parame-
ters.228  Cabot accused Specialty Composites of producing an
infringing earplug.
229
Specialty argued against infringement on the ground that whereas
its earplugs used internal plasticizers, Cabot's specification only
contemplated external plasticizers. 21 The Court rejected Specialty's
argument, reasoning that Cabot's specification "never uses the terms
'external' or 'internal' plasticizer and does not implicitly distinguish
between them. The three examples of foams in the specification are
externally plasticized polyvinylchloride. However, particular embodi-
ments appearing in the specification will not generally be read into
the claims."
211
The Federal Circuit reiterated the principle that limitations in the
specification do not necessarily limit the scope of the claims in
Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc. 23 2 At issue in Ekchian was the meaning of
the phrase "conductive liquid-like medium," as recited in Ekchian's
claim to a capacitative displacement sensor useful in leveling
devices. 233 Ekchian's device was an improvement over the prior art
by virtue of its replacement of typical prior art liquid dielectrics with
a solid dielectric, and the replacement of a fixed capacitor plate with
225. 845 F.2d 981, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
226. Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981,984,6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601,1602
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
227. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
228. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1602.
229. See id. at 985, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1603.
230. See id. at 986-89, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604-06.
231. Id at 987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1604.
232. 104 F.3d 1299, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
233. SeeEkchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299,1301, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364,1366-
67 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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a conductive liquid.2" These changes rendered Ekchian's device
superior to prior devices in its sensitivity to tilt.2"
Ekchian sued for infringement.' The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement on
the basis of a claim construction in which the claim phrase "conduc-
tive liquid-like medium" was held to require a conductivity similar to
the examples contained in Ekchian's specification. 37 The lower
court reasoned that Ekchian's proposed broad construction of the
"conductive" term would render the term meaningless, as it would
"'include virtually all liquids (and indeed materials) on the plan-




On review, the Federal Circuit noted that "[b ] ecause the specifica-
tion does not use the term 'conductive' in a special or unique way, its
ordinary meaning to one skilled in the art controls."2' Further-
more, "[w ]hile examples disclosed in the preferred embodiment may
aid in the proper interpretation of a claim term, the scope of a claim
is not necessarily limited by such examples."241 The Federal Circuit
rejected the lower court's argument that Ekchian's broad construction
would render the term meaningless, reasoning that:
Both [defendant] and Ekchian agree that the term "conductive"
ordinarily means the ability to transport electric charge. Further-
more, it is undisputed that the specification and prosecution history
both state that the liquid must act as a capacitor plate, which must
necessarily store electric charge. Therefore, one skilled in the art
of capacitor design would recognize that the term "conductive"
modifies "liquid-like medium" in the claims to indicate that the
liquid must act as a capacitor plate, i.e., that it must be sufficiently
more conductive than the dielectric material so that it stores
electric charge.242
Thus, the Federal Circuit inferred a functional criterion that did,
in effect, impose some limitation on Ekchian's claim term (thus giving
it meaning), but found no reason to go so far as to import the
234. See id. at 1304, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
235. See id. at 1301, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1365.
236. See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
237. See id. at 1302, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366-67.
238. See id,, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (rejecting Ekchian's definition of "conductive" as
"the slightest ability to carry a current").
239. See id, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366. This claim construction precluded literal infringe-
ment. In addition, the district court found that prosecution history estoppel also precluded
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. See id at 1303, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
240. M, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (internal citations omitted).
241. 1&, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367 (internal citations omitted).
242. M, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
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limitations in the specification's examples.2' Accordingly, the
district court's holding of no infringement was vacated and remanded
for further proceedings to determine whether the liquid in the
accused device acts as a capacitor plate, i.e., stores the electric charge
that generates the measured capacitance."' If the liquid acts as a
capacitor plate, then the liquid is a "conductive liquid-like medium
within the meaning of the claims."2"
2. A surface exception to the general rule: interpreting means-plus-
function claims
As discussed above, the Federal Circuit will look to a patent's
specification for help in interpreting claim terms, but it will not
import limitations from the specification into claims. However, so-
called means-plus-function claim elements seemingly constitute an
exception to this rule. With a means-plus-function limitation, the
specification will, by statute, directly limit the claim's scope. Section
112, paragraph 6 of the patent statute pertaining to specifications of
patent applications characterizes this situation:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the
recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure,
material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents
thereof.
24 6
The statute thus authorizes patent applicants to write structure claims
that include functional phrases such as "means for weighing" instead
of the term "scale."247  However, when Section 112, paragraph 6 is
243. See id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
244. See id. at 1305, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1368.
245. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1369.
246. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
247. See id. A threshhold question is whether a claim invokes 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6,
analysis at all. The use of the word "means" in a claim raises the presumption that the drafter
intended to invoke 35 U.S.C. § 116, paragraph 6. SeeYork Prods. Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm
& Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568, 1574,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1623 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (discussing
role of § 112, paragraph 6 in drafting of claims); Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc., 91
F.3d 1580, 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783, 1786-87 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting tht use of term
"means" generally invokes § 112, paragraph 6). "Nonetheless, mere incantation of the word
.means' in a clause reciting predominantly structure cannot evoke section 112, Para. 6." York
Prods., 99 F.3d at 1574, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623; see also Waterloo Furniture Components
Ltd. v. Haworth Inc., 798 F. Supp. 489,493-94,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1138, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
("[L]ooking at the language of the claims, the specification and the prosuction history, we find
no evidence that a person ... would understand any of the claims in dispute, except the
reference to 'first means' ... and 'second means' ... , to include a means-plus-function
element."). However, the recitation of some elements of structure in a purported means-plus-
function claim element does not automatically preclude reliance on § 112, paragraph 6. See York
Prods., 99 F.3d at 1574, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623; AMP Inc. v. Fujitsu Microelectronics Inc.,
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invoked, the specification must be consulted to determine what
structure(s) in the specification are described that perform the
function recited in the claim.2" Accordingly, "means for weighing"
does not encompass any structure for weighing, but rather only those
structures for weighing described in the specification, or equivalents
of those structures.249
The facts and analysis in In re Donaldson Co.211 illustrate how means-
plus-function claims are to be interpreted. Donaldson submitted a
patent application directed to a novel industrial dust collector.25 '
Prior art dust collectors suffered from a basic problem: filtered dust
would collect and cake on the walls of the collector, eventually
clogging it, and requiring stop-and-start cleaning processes to remove
the hardened dust 252  Donaldson's device solved this problem by
employing a flexible wall that functioned, essentially, as a diaphragm-
like device that could expand in response to pressure increases. 5
This movement by the flexible wall breaks up any hardened, caked-on
dust.21 The dust then falls to the bottom of the device, where it can
be easily removed. 5
The USPTO rejected Donaldson's device as being obvious over
prior art primarily because Donaldson claimed his invention in means-
plus-function format. 6 In relevant part, the claim at issue recited
"means ... for moving particulate matter in a downward direction to
a bottommost point in said portion for subsequent transfer to a
location exterior to said assembly. 257  The claim language itself
does not recite that the means must be flexible. 5 ' As such, the
853 F. Supp. 808, 819, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1712 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that "'means
plus function' language may be present despite the appearance of structural language so long
as the structural language merely defines the function"). Our focus in this piece is on how the
Federal Circuit interprets means-plus-function claims once they have been determined to fall
in this category.
248. See Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981,987, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1601,
1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
249. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605. An applicant may, in his specification, describe
several alternative structures that accomplish the weighing function, and in doing so, broaden
his patent. But the literal scope of the means-plus-fmction claim will still be restricted to the
described structures and their equivalents. See id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
250. 16 F.3d 1189, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
251. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1190, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1845, 1846 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
252. See id. at 1191, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1846.
253. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
254. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
255. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
256. See id. at 1191-92, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847-48.
257. 1& at 1191, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
258. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. The court later discusses how flexibility appears
in Schelier's "summary of invention." Id. at 1195, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
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USPTO found the claim obvious over the prior art, which arguably
contained a structure responsive to pressure increases, which, in
essence, performed the recited function of moving particulate matter
in a downward direction.2
9
The Federal Circuit reversed, pointing to the Section 112, para-
graph 6 requirement that when interpreting a means-plus-function
claim a court must consult the specification as to the actual structures
described that perform the function recited in the claim.2 °
Donaldson's specification clearly described its structure for moving
particulate matter in a downward direction as requiring a flexible
wall. 6 ' No flexible wall dust collectors existed in the prior art, and no
prior art suggested making one.262 Therefore, the court found
Donaldson's claim to be nonobvious, and consequently, patent-
able.263
The court went further to point out that looking to the specifica-
tion to find structural limitations when interpreting means-plus-
function claims is not really an exception to the general rule that
limitations in the specification are not read into claims.26 Rather, the
court noted that "[w]hat we are dealing with... is the construction
of a limitation already in the claim in the form of a means-plus-
function clause and a statutory mandate on how that clause must be
construed."2' Thus, means-plus-function language already incorpo-
rates, by reference to the specification, structural limitations on the
scope of the means.21 No additional limitations are brought into the
claim beyond those that were in the claim already, by virtue of the
means-plus-function language.267
3. Means-plus-function claim elements in infringement cases
From the foregoing discussion, we see that a critical step in
interpreting a means-plus-function claim involves determining what
structures described in a patentee's specification accomplish the
259. See id. at 1197, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
260. See id. at 1192-96, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848-51.
261. See id. at 1195-97, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850-52.
262. See id. at 1197, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852.
263. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1852. In response to the Donaldson decision, the
USPTO issued examination guidelines for examining means-plus-function claims, which
incorporate the Federal Circuit's interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112,1 6, as set forth in Donaldson.
See 1162 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 59 (May 17, 1994).
264. See Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
265. Id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
266. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
267. See id., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
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functions recited in the patentee's claim.2" If the structure em-
ployed by the accused device is the same as, or is equivalent to, the
structure that appears in a device accused of infringing the claim,
then a finding of infringement is likely, assuming that the functional
limitation has been met as well.269 A key determination concerns how
much of the structure described in the specification will be used as
the yardstick in assessing identity or equivalence of structure.
In Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co.,270 the patentee
(Valmont) claimed an irrigating apparatus.27 ' The invention solved
an important problem in agriculture: conventional automatic
irrigation apparatuses could supply water to a circular area of land,
but not to the corners of a square plot, thus rendering the corners of
a square plot unusable for growing crops.272 The patentee solved this
problem by mounting an "extension arm" on the main, centrally
pivoted arm of conventional water sprinklers.Y The "extension arm"
was designed to swing out at particular intervals in order to supply
water to areas missed by the main arm.274
A key aspect of the invention was how the device determined when
the extension arm should actually extend, how far it should extend,
and for how long.27 The patentee's claim recited the function of a
critical means-plus-function limitation in extremely broad terms:
"[C]ontrol means for operating said moving means to move said
extension arm assembly relative to said main arm assembly."276
Reinke began marketing a competing extension-arm sprinkler, and
Valmont filed suit for infringement.277  In Reinke's device, the
extension arm was guided by electrical signals generated by an
underground electromagnetic cable.278 As described by the Court,
"[s] ensors on Reinke's extension arm receive signals from this buried
wire. The sensors, in turn, send a steering signal to keep the wheels
[of the extension arm] on the path of the buried cable. In this
268. See supra notes 246-67 and accompanying text.
269. SeeValmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1451, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that accused device must use identical or equivalent means
and function, as specified in claims, for means-plus-function limitation to apply).
270. 983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
271. SeeValmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1040,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1451, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
272. See id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452.
273. See id. at 1040-41, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
274. See id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
275. See id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1452-53.
276. Id., 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
277. See id. at 1041, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
278. See id. at 1044, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1455.
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manner, the Reinke arm follows the buried cable around the
field."2 9  The lower court found that Reinke's extension arm
infringed Valmont's claim, because the accused device performed the
claimed function of moving the extension arm relative to the main
arm assembly, and did so by employing a structure that interpreted
and relayed electrical signals. 8°
The Federal Circuit reversed, reasoning that:
even though both the control means in the specification [of
Valmont's patent] and the control means on Reinke's device use
electric signals, the structures generating those signals are strikingly
different. Reinke's structure senses electromagnetic signals from a
buried cable. The invention described in [Valmont's patent] senses
the angular relations between the main arm and the extension arm
and generates signals to adjust and maintain that relationship as the
main arm rotates.
28'
The emphasis on sensing the angular relationship between the
extension arm and main arm, and not simply the use of electrical
signals to sense and relay messages, was, for the Federal Circuit, the
critical aspect of Valmont's structure that distinguished it from
Reinke's device. 82
This case thus illustrates how a specification can limit a means-plus-
function claim element. Had Valmont contemplated alternative
means of sensing and relaying signals to allow for guidance of its
extension-arm sprinkler in its specification, a wider scope of protec-
tion would likely have been accorded to its patent.23 In addition, the
case illustrates that a primary interpretative task performed by the
Federal Circuit in construing means-plus-function claim elements is
the proper assessment of the function recited in the claim.
The Federal Circuit quoted Valmont with approval in the post-
Markman case, Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc.2" In Lockwood, the
plaintiff had asserted its patents covering a computerized system of
tailoring sales presentations against American. Lockwood's claim at
issue required, inter alia, that its systems have a means for "composing
279. M, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 14t-5.
280. See Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380-83 (D.
Neb. 1990), rev'd, 983 F.2d 1039, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
281. See Valmon, 983 F.2d at 1044, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
282. See id. at 1044-45, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
283. See id. at 1044,25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456 (stating that, although Valmont's disclosed
guidance structure in its patent specification and Reinke's actual guidance structure in its
irrigation device both use electronic signals, "the structures generating those signals are
strikingly different").
284. 107 F.3d 1565, 1576, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1969 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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an individualized sales presentation." 2' The lower court found, and
the Federal Circuit agreed, that "composing" as used in the claim did
not encompass systems wherein photographs are manually selected
and viewed from a generated list. Lockwood did not dispute that
American's system employed such manual selection.28 6 Affirming
the lower court's finding of no infringement, the Federal Circuit
pointed out that insofar as American's system "does not perform the
functions required by the properly construed claims, e.g., it does not
'compose' an 'individualized sales presentation' within the meaning
of the claims, there is no need to compare the structure of the
accused device to the structure disclosed in the patent."
287
As Lockwood illustrates, once a means-plus-function claim element
has been properly interpreted, infringement is then determined with
respect to the factual questions of whether an accused device performs
the function recited in the patentee's claim, and whether the accused
device's structure is identical or equivalent
2 l
In reviewing a lower court's assessment of equivalent structures
under Section 112, paragraph 6, the Federal Circuit has accorded
deference to extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony in reviewing
such fact-based infringement findings.289  For example, in Symbol
Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc.,2 expert testimony proffered by the
patentee was dispositive in the Federal Circuit's affirmance of the
lower court's finding of infringement.29 1  Symbol Technologies
claimed a laser-based, bar-coding scanner with a novel "aim and
shoot" feature that enabled a user to scan bar codes without the need
for making actual contact between the scanner and the bar code.292
The "aim and shoot" feature was recited in the claims, in relevant
part, as follows: "miniature optic means ... to permit the user to
conveniently register the laser light beam on the symbol [i.e., a
285. I at 1569, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964.
286. See id. at 1576, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969.
287. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1969 (quoting Valmont for the proposition that "[t]he
accused device must... perform the identical function as specified in the claims").
288. See King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 862, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 402,
408 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (determining that question of whether accused process uses identical
structures as those in patentee's specification is a factual inquiry).
289. See id., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 408-09 (noting importance of expert testimony in
determination of equivalents under section 112).
290. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
291. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1574-76, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1241, 1244-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that opinion testimony claiming patent infringement
was admissible despite absence of factual foundation underlying testimony in accordance with
Rule 705 of Federal Rules of Evidence).
292. See id. at 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
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generic reference to 'bar code'] by sighting the symbol along a direct
line of sight .... 293
Opticon produced a competing device, and Symbol sued for
infringement 2' The case turned on the factual question of whether
Opticon's device contained structures that were either identical or
equivalent to the rather complex structures, disclosed in Symbol's
specification, which performed the recited functions.295 Symbol
offered expert testimony by a coinventor of Symbol's device.296 The
coinventor introduced detailed charts and drawings, from which he
opined that each claim limitation was met by a corresponding
structure in Opticon's accused devices.297 The lower court found
for Symbol.298 The Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Symbol's
expert testimony made out a prima facie case for infringement, which
was not effectively rebutted through Opticon's cross-examination of
Symbol's expert witness.2 9  Symbol had thus met its burden of
proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. Clearly
the shift from a question of law (interpreting the claim) to a question
of fact (in identifying equivalents) worked in Symbol's favor.
C. Preamble Claim Terms
Terms in claim preambles are construed consistently with general
principles of claim interpretation."°°  However, the threshhold
question in interpreting claim preambles is whether the preamble
constitutes a limitation at all. As a general rule, preamble terms do
not constitute limitations when the body of the claim includes "a self-
contained description of the structure [being claimed] not depending
for completeness upon the introductory clause," '' or when "the
preamble merely state[s] a purpose or intended use of [the] subject
matter [recited in the body of the claim] ."s2 By contrast, a pream-
ble term will confer a limitation when the preamble term is "consid-
ered necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality" to the claim.03
293. Id, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
294. See id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
295. See id. at 1574, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
296. See id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
297. See id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
298. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1738 (S.D.N.Y.
1990), aft'd, 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
299. See Symbol Techs., 935 F.2d at 1574-76, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244-46.
300. SeeBell Communications Research Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615,
620, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1816, 1819 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
301. Kropa v. Robie, 187 F.2d 150, 152, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 478, 480 (C.C.PA. 1951).
302. Id., 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 481.
303. See id. at 152, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480-81.
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However, despite the surface clarity of these rules, the Federal
Circuit explained in Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A.,
IncY°4 that
No litmus test can be given with respect to when the introductory
words of a claim, the preamble, constitute a statement of purpose
for a device or are, in themselves, additional structural limitations
of a claim. To say that a preamble is a limitation if it gives
"meaning to the claim" may merely state the problem rather than
lead one to the answer. The effect preamble language should be
given can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the patent
to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented
and intended to encompass by the claim."0 5
The facts and analysis in Coming Glass Works reveal what the Federal
Circuit looks for in assessing "what the inventors actually invented and
intended to encompass by the claim.""0 6 Coming's invention was
directed to "optical waveguides" for use in communications sys-
tems. 7 Coming's claim recited "an optical waveguide comprising"
several elements.30 Sumitomo produced competing waveguides,
and Coming sued for infringement." Sumitomo asserted as a
defense that Coming's claim was invalid because it was anticipated by
a prior art reference that contained all of the elements recited in the
body of Coming's claim. 10 Coming contended that the preamble
term "optical waveguide" constituted a limitation not met by the prior
art reference (but met by Sumitomo's device)."'
The case thus turned on the Federal Circuit's interpretation of the
preamble. The Federal Circuit first noted that Coming had defined
"optical waveguide" quite precisely in its specification as follows:
"[T] ransmitting media [for frequencies around 101' hz] are hereinaf-
ter referred to as 'optical waveguides.' . . . [A]n optical waveguide
should allow only preselected modes of light to propagate along the
fiber." 2 The specification also contained information about the
desired physical attributes of an "optical waveguide.""3 Moreover,
Coming's specification made clear:
304. 868 F.2d 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1962 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
305. Coming Glass Works v. Sumimoto Elec. U.SA., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257,9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1962, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
306. Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
307. See id. at 1255, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1964.
808. See id. at 1256, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965.
309. See id. at 1255, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965.
310. See id. at 1255-56, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965.
311. See id. at 1256-57, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-66.
312. Id. at 1256, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1965-66.
313. Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
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that the inventors were working on the particular problem of an
effective optical communication system not on general improve-
ments in conventional optical fibers. To read the claim in light of
the specification indiscriminantly to cover all types of optical fibers
would be divorced from reality. The invention is restricted to those
fibers that work as waveguides as defined in the specification, which
is not true with respect to fibers constructed with the limitations [in
the body of the claim] only.314
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the preamble of Coming's
claim was essential to define the invention 15 The Federal Circuit's
interpretation of Coming's preamble had the effect of both preserv-
ing the validity of Coming's claim 16 and supporting a finding of
infringement by Sumitomo.1
A similar result ensued in the post-Markman case, Rowe v. Dror.18
In an interference proceeding, Dror filed a motion for judgment
against Rowe on the ground that some of Rowe's claims were
anticipated by the prior art. The claims at issue were in Jepson
format, 19 and recited the phrase "[i]n a balloon angioplasty catheter."
The prior art taught a general purpose catheter, but did not
specifically teach an angioplasty catheter.20 The PTO Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences found Rowe's claims anticipated and
entered judgment against Rowe. Rowe appealed to the Federal
Circuit.
At issue on appeal was whether the term "angioplasty" in the
preamble of Rowe's claims conferred a limitation. Quoting Coming
Glass Works for the proposition that "[t] he determination of whether
preamble recitations are structural limitations or mere statements of
purpose or use 'can be resolved only on review of the entirety of the
patent .. ," 21 the court found that "angioplasty" indeed conferred
a limitation that distinguished Rowe's claim over the prior art.322
314. I& at 1257, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
315. See id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
316. See id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966.
317. See id. at 1261, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1970.
318. 112 F.3d 473, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
319. The Jepson format is conventionally used for improvement patents. Such claims
generally contain a preamble that sets forth "elements or steps of the claimed invention which
are conventional or known," followed by the body of the claim setting forth the improvement.
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.75(e) (1997).
320. See Rowe, 112 F.3d at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1555.
321. Id. at 478,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553 (quoting Corning Glass Works, 868 F.2d at 1257,
9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1966).
322. See id. at 479, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553-54.
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The preamble of a claim may thus be critical. When drafting
claims, applicants should take special care in evaluating the impact of
terms placed in preambles.
D. Expansion of a Claim's Reach Under the Doctrine of Equivalents
1. The relationship between claim interpretation and the doctrine of
equivalents
The foregoing discussion has focused on the strategies used by the
Federal Circuit to construe the literal scope of a claim. However, a
claim's reach can, in principle, be expanded somewhat to cover a
"penumbra" of embodiments, which, while they do not fall within the
literal scope of a claim, are nevertheless so similar to a patentee's
claimed invention that for all intents and purposes they ought to be
considered the same"~ through operation of the judicially created
"doctrine of equivalents." 24 The doctrine of equivalents is designed
to protect inventors from those who might otherwise "'make
unimportant and insubstantial changes and substitutions in... [a]
patent which, though adding nothing, would be enough ... [to
evade] the reach of the law."'' I
Unlike claim interpretation questions, however, the relevant inquiry
for a doctrine of equivalents infringement analysis consists of afactual
determination of whether the differences between the claimed
invention and accused product or process are insubstantial.
326
323. See5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03[1], at 18-27 (1997) (reproducing
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 704-05 (Ct.
Cl. 1967), as a good example of the expansion of claim interpretation analysis from literal scope
to the doctrine of equivalents).
324. Id § 18.04, at 18-73.
325. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (in banc), rev'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (per
curiam) (quoting Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)).
326. See id. at 1520, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647. A core test under the "insubstantial
differences" standard is whether the accused product or process performs "substantially the same
function in substantially the same way to give substantially the same result" as the claimed
invention. SeeAtlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1579, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 409, 416 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
For an example of this doctrine in practice, see Hilton Davis 63 F.3d at 1520, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1647. Hilton Davis claimed a novel process for purifying dyes. See id, at 1515, 35
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. Warner-Jenkinson used a similar process for purifying dyes. See id.
at 1516, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1643. In a suit brought by Hilton Davis, a district courtjury
found for Hilton Davis on the ground that Warner-Jenkinson infringed Hilton Davis' claim
under the doctrine of equivalents. In doing so, the court found that Warner-Jenkinson's process
functioned in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same result. See id. at 1524,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-57. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on
the ground that there was substantial evidence to justify the jury's finding of fact. See id. at 1523-
25,35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650-51. The Supreme Court reversed, however, on the ground that
Hilton Davis had not provided a reason why its claim had a lower pH limit of 6-0, and therefore
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Insubstantial differences may be found on the basis of criteria such as
extrinsic evidence of functional equivalency, and such findings are
reviewed by the Federal Circuit for clear error.27
The doctrine of equivalents thus represents a separate and distinct
inquiry that is independent of claim interpretation per se.328 A narrow
interpretation of a claim term will not necessarily preclude invocation
of the doctrine. For example, as discussed above,2 9 the Federal
Circuit in Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations Inc.,3' reversed a finding of
literal infringement based on its interpretation of the literal scope
afforded by the claim term "about."33' Nevertheless, the court
affirmed a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equiva-
lents.3 2  The rationale for affirmance, however, resided not in an
expansion of claim scope under the doctrine on the basis of the
recitation of the claim term "about," but rather in the factual record
showing equivalency of nylon material having a ratio of 4:1 with nylon
material having a ratio in the claimed range of "about 5:1 to about
7:L"'33
2. Unforeseen embodiments
As was the case for literal infringement under the Federal Circuit's
decision in Phillips Petroleum,"s discussed above,35 the doctrine of
equivalents can likewise enable a patentee to enforce its patent against
later improvements, unforeseen at the time the patentee filed the
application. 36 The case of Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United StateP3 7
might be estopped to assert the doctrine of equivalents to ensure processes rising pH's lowers
than 6-0.
327. See id, at 1520, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646-47. Other factors, such as the known
interchangeability of ingredients, may buttress a finding of infringement under the doctrine.
See id. at 1519, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
328. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1216, 1218, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (describing claim interpretation as a question of law and
infringement by equivalency as a question of fact).
329. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
330. 66 F.3d 1211, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
331. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1218,36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1229 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
332. See id. at 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
333. Id., 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
334. See United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
335. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
336. See Pall 66 F.3d at 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (finding that nylon 46
membranes not commercially available at the time of Pall's invention and therefore not included
in Pall's experimentation with nylon 66 infringed on Pall's patent by virture of nylon 66's
similarity in chemical structure and function to Pall's claimed nylon 46); Phillips Petroleum, 865
F.2d at 1252, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1465 (finding that the definition of terms can change over
time as the relevant art changes).
337. 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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demonstrates the doctrine's power in this regard. Hughes designed
a novel communications satellite that could hover at a fixed point
above the earth.3" Hughes' satellite filled a long-standing need in the
art,339 and represented a practical solution to the previously insoluble
technical problem of providing a satellite with "attitude control"-the
ability to properly orient the satellite in space at will.' Hughes'
system could control a satellite's orientation by relaying signals from
the ground to the satellite." i The ground-based signals would cause
jets on the satellite to fire pulses at selected satellite positions for
selected periods of time.'
Hughes' claims were drafted in means-plus-function format.' A
central issue in the case concerned the following claim limitations:
e. means disposed on said body for providing an indication to
a location external to said body of the instantaneous ...
position of said body...
f. and means disposed on said body for receiving from said
location control signals synchronized with said indica-
tion.34
The claim's limitations, as well as the structures described in Hughes'
specification for fulfilling the functions recited in the claim, consisted
only of bodies (satellites, as described in the specification) that
dispatched and received external signals to and from the ground.'
The U.S. government subsequently began to manufacture or use
communications satellites having "attitude control," and Hughes sued
the government for patent infringement."4  The government
338. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1353,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473,
474 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The advantages of such a satellite that both Hughes and the U.S.
Government sought were the abilities to keep the directional antennae pointed toward the earth
and to keep the solar cells in the exposure of the sun at all times. This system would ensure
constant communications and a reliable power supply. See id,, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474-75.
339. See id. at 1352, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474. The U.S. Department of Defense and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration aggressively pursued the technology to enable
deployment of a synchronus communications satellite, though neither entity was successful in
its efforts despite large monetary expenditures. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 474.
340. See id. at 1353, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474-75.
341. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474-76. The satellite could also constantly transmit
positional information to earth based on its sun sensor. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 474.
This information allowed the ground crew to monitor its location and direction at all times. See
id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 474.
342. See i&., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 475. The movement of the satellite was accomplished
through pulse bursts of gas known as "precessing." Id, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 476.
343. See id. at 1355, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 476.
344. I., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 476.
345. See i&. at 1354, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 475 (indicating that the examiner rejected
inclusion of ground control apparatus in patent application because of insufficient information).
346. See id at 1356, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 476 (outlining plaintiff's claim, after patent
issuance, that Government employed Hughes' claimed invention in the SKYNET II, NATO II,
DSCD II, IMP (H andj), SOLRAD (9 and 10), and PIONEER (10 and 11) spacecrafts).
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contended that its satellites did not infringe Hughes' patent because
Hughes' claims required the relay of signals to a satellite from an
external location, whereas the government's satellites employed a
"store and execute" control system. 7 In such a.system, instructions
for when jets should fire, and for how long, were stored in a
computer program on board the satellites, and were later executed to
cause the jets to fire at the preprogrammed intervals." Accordingly,
the government argued that its satellites did not employ a system
requiring relay of signals from an external location, and therefore
could not infringe Hughes' patent. 9 The district court agreed with
the government's arguments, on the ground that a claim limitation
was clearly missing from the government's accused satellites, and thus
infringement could not lie, either literally or under the doctrine of
equivalents. 30
The Federal Circuit reversed. 5' The court agreed that there was no
literal infringement, but nevertheless found infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents. 52 The Federal Circuit reasoned that the
principle difference between Hughes' claimed satellite and the
government's accused satellites was the presence in the government's
satellites of an on-board computer that performed the functions
accomplished by Hughes' ground-based system. 3 In the words of
the court:
The [government's] spacecraft are identical with the [Hughes]
satellite, except for the employment of sophisticated, post-[Hughes'
invention] equipment (computers) to achieve attitude control in
the same basic manner taught by [Hughes]. Advanced computers
347. See id. at 1360-61, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480 (elaborating on the differences between
Hughes' satellite and "store or execute," or S/E, spacecraft with respect to locational and
navigational technology).
348. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 480.
349. See id. at 1365, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 483 (commenting that if S/E spacecraft sent
signals to ground crews Hughes would have a clear claim for literal infringement).
350. See id. at 1358,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 477-78 (announcing the trial judges' decision on
remand from the U.S. Court of Claims). With respect to the claims, the trial judge found an
absence of literal infringement based on the different control schemes-on-board versus
external control. The trialjudge found, further, that the S/E spacecraft did not infringe under
the doctrine of equivalents its position signal or precessing technologies. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 477-78.
351. See id at 1366, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 484 (finding an infringment of Hughes' claims,
reversing the lower court's ruling, but affirming the lower court's finding of claim validity).
352. See id., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 484 ("The S/E spacecraft and the claimed Williams
satellite ... perform the same function ... in substantially the same way ... to obtain
substantially the same result .... Accordingly, we hold that Hughes has proven that the
government's S/E spacecraft infringes Williams' claims ... under the doctrine of equivalents.").
353. See i&., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 484 (finding no differences between the satellite's and
S/E spacecraft's basic manner of operation other than the location of where navigational tasks
are performed).
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and digital communications techniques developed since [Hughes'
invention] permit doing on-board a part of what [Hughes] taught
as done on the ground. As one of our predecessor courts, the
Court of Claims, has thrice made clear, that partial variation in
technique, an embellishment made possible by post-[Hughes'
invention] technology, does not allow the accused spacecraft to
escape the "web of infringement. ' -'
The Hughes case thus teaches that a patentee will be protected from
having its patent rendered effectively worthless by unforeseen
improvements in the art that not only accomplish substantially the
same thing as the patentee's invention, but in fact may well have been
prompted by the patentee's disclosure."' The decision in Hughes
is consistent with the policy set forth in Phillips Petroleum, and was, in
essence, reaffirmed in the Supreme Court's recent statement in its




An understanding of how U.S. courts interpret patent claims is
critical to ensure the effective drafting of claims during patent
prosecution and for effective argument during litigation. The
foregoing discussion has provided an overview of the Federal Circuit's
claim interpretation processes in the pre- and post-Markman eras in
an effort to help patent practitioners in both of these areas.
Although post-Markman claim interpretation presents new challenges,
it is hoped that the digests presented here demonstrate that interpre-
tative arguments from intrinsic evidence are not a new phenomenon,
that pre-Markman decisions by the Federal Circuit can provide useful
guidance as to how the court will likely interpret claims from intrinsic
evidence in the future, and that the current interpretative era still
presents opportunities for presentation of extrinsic evidence in the
form of expert testimony in appropriate circumstances.
354. Id. at 1365, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 483.
355. It is important to note, however, that the subsequent improvement may itself be entitled
to a patent, even if the improvement will infringe an earlier patent.
356. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512,1517,35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1644 (Fed Cir. 1995) (in banc), reo'd on other grounds, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) (per
curiam). The final outcome of the Hughes case remains in doubt, as the Supreme Court has
remanded the matter to the Federal Circuit for re-evaluation of the claims under Hilton Davi.
See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 117 S. Ct. 1466 (1997).
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